e. after choosing and performing an action. Under the belief of having freely chosen the action among all possible alternatives, the conscious agent perceives

that FW is at work. Since the agent must be both the chooser and the ABT-737 witness (of him or herself), we need to clearly define the nature, limits, and subjective perceptions of the “rational” agent we are dealing with. For example, we must take into account that the idea of possessing FW is firmly rooted in the agent’s psyche. Thus, the definition of the agent as “rational” seems limited since it necessarily excludes the agent’s unconscious world. Another issue arising from the definition is the suggestion that FW does not exist though we believe we possess it (FW illusion). We should ask ourselves if our will is really free since the action decision-making is conditioned by the prior stimulus and the best expectation

of action outcome depends only on a cause-effect relationship. Being that our decision is always ‘conditioned’ we must logically conclude we are never free. Alternatively, there might be only click here one possibility to be really free and that is to decide an action by chance, for instance by throwing dice (eventuality which might be true of an insane mind). The paradox lies in the fact that a conscious agent believes in FW because he or she accepts the possibility that there might be conditioning even though he or she perceives him or herself as an agent who

is “free from causes”. Philosophy and psychology cannot mistake Fossariinae conditioning for a form of freedom so the question of why FW illusion is perceived by everybody needs to be resolved. A possible explanation is that FW illusion might simply serve as confirmation of one being alive and sane. Another possibility is that the illusion of FW might exert a functional role in cognitive processes. These inferences may lend credibility to the theory put forward in TBM. If you looked for a definition of ‘consciousness’ in a philosophical dictionary you would soon desist. The difficulty of providing a generally accepted definition is due to the gap that exists between the neurobiological mechanisms of brain and the apparently non-physicalist nature of the mind’s activity (which keeps the debate on dualism going). There is general consensus that FW and consciousness are closely linked. In fact, the “freedom of will” (Van Gulick, 2011) has been thought to open a realm of possibilities, a sphere of options within which the conscious self might choose or act freely. At a minimum, consciousness might seem a necessary precondition for any such freedom or self-determination.